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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions of burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, 
a class A misdemeanor, in the Second Judicial District, Davis County, the Honorable 
Darwin C. Hansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Where defense counsel affirmatively approved all of the jury instructions 
below, should this Court review Instruction 33 for plain error? 
Standard of review. No standard of review applies to this question. 
2. Did defense counsel perform deficiently for not objecting to the instruction, 
where the instruction did not raise a presumption of guilt and did not reduce the State's 
burden of proof? 
Standard of review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal, presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 
162. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are reproduced in Addendum A.-
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of burglary, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 (West 2004), and one count of theft, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404 (West 2004). Rl. 
A jury found defendant guilty on both counts. R77; Rl 05:326. The trial court imposed 
an indeterminate prison term of 1 to 15 years for the burglary conviction and a concurrent 
term of 180 days for the theft conviction. R31-33. Defendant timely appealed. R79. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At about 5:30 p.m. on November 18, 2003, Sandra Deason returned home to find 
that someone had entered her home and stolen stereo subwoofers, pool cues, various 
items of jewelry, her son Zachary's checkbook, and Zachary's wallet containing his 
driver's license and passport. R106:118-21. Her neighbor had seen two males in their 
late twenties in front of the Deason home loading what appeared to be a stereo amplifier 
into their vehicle at approximately 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. R106:109-11. 
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At about 3:50 p.m. that afternoon, Ron Camomile, a Fred Meyers Corporation 
employee, observed two males in his store. R106:127. One appeared to be Hispanic or 
Italian; the other appeared to be white. R106:128. Noting the behavior of the two males, 
Camomile went to his office to follow them on security cameras. Id. 
Camomile watched the males as they were ringing up their purchases. R106:130. 
The Caucasian male pulled out a checkbook and offered a check as payment. Id. 
Camomile identified defendant as the Caucasian male. Id. Pictures from the store video 
also showed defendant writing the check. R106:132-33. 
The check, presented at trial, bore the name Zachary J. Deason. R106:145. 
Someone had written Zachary Deason's driver's license and passport numbers on the 
check. R106:147-48. 
Two days later on November 20, defendant presented another of Zachary 
Deason's checks at a Maverik convenience store. R106:173-81, 195. He used Zachary's 
passport and driver's license as identification. R106:178-80. 
Later that day, someone purchasing two Cricket cell phones presented another of 
Zachary Deason's checks at another Maverik store. Rl06:203. 
That same day defendant's girlfriend was found in possession of a necklace, 
earring, and watch. R106:245-47. Defendant had given them to her. R106:245. 
Officers later searched defendant's bedroom where they found an unopened 
Cricket cell phone. R106:232. They also found a ring. R105:257, 264. 
Sandra Deason identified the necklace, earring, watch, and ring as items taken 
from her home on November 18. Rl05:268-70. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim that the trial court plainly erred when it gave Jury Instruction 
33 is not properly before this Court. Defendant did not merely fail to object to the 
instruction. Rather, defendant affirmatively approved this and all other jury instructions. 
In so doing, he invited the error he now claims on appeal. This Court therefore will not 
review his claim under the plain error or manifest injustice doctrine. 
Counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to Instruction 33. The instruction set 
forth inferences that the jury could draw from the possession of recently stolen property 
coupled with other incriminating circumstances. It did not, however, require the jury to 
draw those inferences. It did not shift the burden of proof on any element to defendant, 
and it did not permit a guilty verdict on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, 
the instruction was constitutionally permissible. Counsel did not perform deficiently for 
not raising a futile objection, and defendant suffered no prejudice. 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred when it gave Jury Instruction 33, 
which set forth inferences the jury could draw from the possession of recently stolen 
property coupled with other incriminating circumstances. He also claims that trial 
counsel performed ineffectively for not objecting to the instruction. He can prevail on 
neither issue. 
I. 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVED ALL OF 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, HE CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS 
CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION 33 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it gave Jury Instruction 33. See 
Appellant's Br. at 9-10. Specifically, he argues that "the trial court impermissibly 
instructed the jury so as to undermine the jury's responsibility to find the ultimate facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt and shift the burden of persuasion to defendant." Id. at 9 
(capitalization and boldface omitted). 
Defendant objected to none of the jury instructions below and therefore raises his 
claim under the plain error/manifest injustice doctrine. See Appellant's Br. at 12. 
Under rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "Unless a party objects to an 
instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as 
error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). "However, if 
counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she 
had no objection to the jury instruction, [the appellate court] will not review the 
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instruction under the manifest injustice exception." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 54, 
70P.3d 111. 
The trial court asked defense counsel whether he had "any exception with respect 
to the proposed instructions." Rl05:276. Defense counsel answered, "No." Id. 
Defendant therefore did not merely fail to object to Instruction 33, but 
affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no objection to that or any other 
instruction. In so doing, counsel invited the error he now claims on appeal, foreclosing 
review for plain error or manifest injustice. See State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ^ j 8, 
132 P.3d 703 (citing Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54). 
II. 
COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO 
INSTRUCTION 33, WHERE THE INSTRUCTION DID NOT SHIFT 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEFENDANT OR PERMIT A 
GUILTY VERDICT ON LESS THAN PROOF BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
Defendant argues alternatively that his counsel performed ineffectively by not 
objecting to the instruction. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
establish both prongs of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984), which holds that such claims succeed only if the defendant demonstrates 
(1) that his counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" 
and (2) that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687-88; see also State 
v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App.1994). Counsel's failure "to make motions or 
objections [that] would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." 
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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Defendant claims that counsel performed ineffectively by failing to object to Jury 
Instruction 33. See Appellant's Br. at 8, 14. He claims that the instruction "raise[d] a 
presumption of guil t . . . impermissibly shifting] the burden to defendant to prove his 
innocence." Id. at 10. He also claims that the instruction could have led the jury to 
"believe[] that the quantum of evidence [required to support a guilty verdict] was 
something less than beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 11. 
Defendant cannot prevail on this claim. Because the instruction contained no 
error, counsel did not perform deficiently by not objecting to it. For the same reason, 
defendant suffered no prejudice. 
A, A defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The State bears the 
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Due Process Clause prescribes the burdens of proof in a criminal case. "The 
prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged." Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 2755 277-78 (1993) (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 1975 210 
(1977); Lelandv. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952)). The prosecution "must persuade 
the 0ury] 'beyond a reasonable doubt5 of the facts necessary to establish each of those 
elements." Id. at 278 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Cool v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam)). The "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
requirement. . . applies in state as well as federal proceedings." Id.; cf. State v. Austin, 
2007 UT 55, ^  6, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 ("The government must prove every element of 
a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (1970)). 
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B. A jury instruction may not raise a presumption of guilt on an element of the 
offense or reduce the prosecution's burden to prove all of the elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"Mandatory presumptions . . . violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the 
State of the burden of persuasion on an element of the offense." Franklin v. Francis, All 
U.S. 307, 314 (1985); see also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521 (1979). A 
mandatory presumption may be either conclusive or rebuttable. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 
314. If conclusive, the "presumption removes the presumed element from the case once 
the State has proved the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption." Id. at n.2. "A 
rebuttable presumption does not remove the presumed element from the case but 
nevertheless requires the jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant 
persuades the jury that such a finding is unwarranted." Id. Thus, whether rebuttable or 
conclusive, mandatory presumptions that relieve the State of its burden of proving 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" all of the elements of a charged offense are unconstitutional. 
A permissive inference, however, "do[es] not necessarily implicate these 
concerns." Franklin, All U.S. at 314. "A permissive inference suggests to the jury a 
possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require 
the jury to draw that conclusion." Id. "A permissive inference does not relieve the State 
of its burden of persuasion because it still requires the State to convince the jury that the 
suggested conclusion should be based on the predicate facts proved." Id. 
Precedent from Utah courts establishes this distinction between mandatory 
presumptions and permissive inferences in the context of jury instructions regarding the 
possession of stolen property. An instruction that sets forth a mamdatory presumption 
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requiring the jury to find theft based on the unexplained possession of recently stolen 
property is unconstitutional. State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 3215 326 (Utah 1985). It shifts 
the burden of proof to the defendant in violation of the defendant's right to a presumption 
of innocence and is therefore unconstitutional, even where it is rebuttable. Id. 
But an instruction stating that the jury "may infer from [possession of stolen 
property together with other incriminating circumstances] that the defendant committed 
the theft" is constitutionally permissible. State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah 
1986) (emphasis added). Instructing jury that it "may infer from [certain] facts" that the 
defendant stole property does not shift State's burden of proof and does not violate due 
process. State v. Carlson, 934 P.2d 657, 659-60 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v. 
Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
In determining whether a jury instruction contains an unconstitutional 
presumption, "[t]he threshold inquiry . . . is to determine the nature of the presumption it 
describes," that is, "whether the challenged portion of the instruction creates a mandatory 
presumption, or merely a permissive inference." Franklin, 471 U.S. at 313-14 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). Then, "[i]f a specific portion of the jury charge, 
considered in isolation, could reasonably have been understood as creating a presumption 
that relieves the State of the burden on persuasion on an element of the offense, the 
potentially offending words must be considered in the context of the charge as a whole." 
Id. at 315. "Other instructions might explain the particular infirm language to the extent 
that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an 
unconstitutional presumption." Id. 
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C. The instruction in this case created only a permissive inference. It did not 
raise a presumption of guilt or otherwise relieve the State of the burden of 
proof. 
Defendant challenges Jury Instruction 33 (reproduced in its entirety in Addendum 
B). That instruction provided that "[possession of articles recently stolen . . . when 
coupled with circumstances inconsistent with innocence . . . may be sufficient to connect 
the possessor with the offense and to justify his conviction for burglary." R53 (emphasis 
added). It further stated, "In order for the defendant's possession of recently stolen 
property to be sufficient to support a conviction of burglary, such possession must be 
recent. . . and such possession must be coupled with a lack of a satisfactory explanation 
or other incriminating circumstances . . . . If these conditions are met, then you may 
consider possession of recently stolen property, coupled with other inculpatory or 
incriminating circumstances as evidence of burglary." Id, (emphasis added). 
The instruction does not set forth a mandatory presumption. It does not instruct 
the jury that it must infer some element of the offense from the possession of recently 
stolen property, together with other inculpatory circumstances. Rather, it states that the 
jury may consider such matters as evidence of burglary. Thus, the instruction merely sets 
forth a permissive inference. It "suggests] to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn" 
if the State proves the possession of recently stolen property, coupled with other 
inculpatory circumstances; it "does not require the jury to draw that conclusion." 
Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314. Thus, it does not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof 
and does not violate due process. 
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D. The instructions properly conveyed the prosecution's burden to prove all of 
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Moreover, "so long as the reasonable doubt jury instructions, taken as a 
whole, . . . correctly convey [] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, they pass 
constitutional muster." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 20, 122 P.3d 543 (quoting Victor v. 
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, If 15, 116 P.3d 305. 
Here, the instructions as a whole conveyed the State's burden to prove all of the 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The preliminary jury instructions 
conveyed this burden. Instruction 14 stated that "the defendant is presumed to be 
innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." R73. It stated that "[t]he 
prosecution has the burden of proof." Id. Instruction 15 told the jury, "Before you can 
give up your assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be convinced that the 
defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. It further mandated 
that "[t]he State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Id. (Instruction 16). 
The instructions given after presentation of the evidence reiterated this standard. 
Instruction 29 recited that the defendant's not guilty plea "casts upon the State the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of [the burglary and theft] 
offenses." R49. It said, "The defendant is not required to prove innocence—you must 
start by assuming it." Id. It continued, "[T]he defendant is presumed to be innocent 
unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt... . Before you can give up your 
assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be convinced that the defendant's 
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guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id Instruction 30 required the jury to 
"find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt" all of the elements of burglary. R50. 
Instruction 34 required that the jury find by the same standard all of the elements of theft. 
R54. Instruction 42 cautioned, "The fact that [defendant] has not taken the witness stand 
must not be taken as any indication of his guilt, nor should you indulge in any 
presumption or inference adverse to him by reason thereof. The burden remains with the 
State, regardless of whether the defendant testifies in his own behalf or not, to prove by 
the evidence his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." R62. 
Thus, the jury instructions clearly conveyed the prosecution's burden of 
persuasion. Nothing in Instruction 33 or in any other instruction relieved the prosecution 
of that burden. For these reasons, the jury instructions as a whole properly conveyed to 
the jury the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's guilt on 
every element of each offense. 
E. Because Jury Instruction 33 was constitutional, trial counsel did not perform 
ineffectively by not objecting to it. 
As explained, Jury Instruction 33 did not include a constitutionally impermissible 
presumption. Objection to the instruction would therefore have been futile. Thus, 
counsel was not deficient for not objecting to it, and defendant suffered no prejudice. See 
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, % 34. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a 
building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is 
a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in Subsections (1) 
(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in the building. 
Amended by Chapter 325, 2003 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_07014.ZIP 2,158 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter)Chapters in this Title|AH Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, July 19, 2007 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is 
made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the property or service stolen if 
another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in 
property for purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the repayment of a debt 
or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the property or 
service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly believing that the owner, if 
present, would have consented. 
Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_07024.ZIP 2,118 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter [Chapters in this TitlejAU Titles) Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, July 19, 2007 
76-6-404. Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_07026.ZIP 1,608 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title)All Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, July 19, 2007 
Addendum B 
INSTRUCTION NO. ,*j?6 
Mere possession of recently stolen property, if not coupled with other inculpatory or 
incriminating circumstances, is not sufficient to support a conviction for burglaiy. Possession of 
articles recently stolen, however, when coupled with circumstances inconsistent with innocence, 
such as hiding or concealing them, or of making a false or improbable or unsatisfactory 
explanation of the possession, may be sufficient to connect the possessor with the offense and to 
justify his conviction for burglary. 
In order for the defendant's possession of recently stolen property to be sufficient to 
support a conviction of burglaiy, such possession must be recent, that is, not too remote in point 
of time from the crime, personal, exclusive (although it may be joint if definite), distinct, 
conscious, and such possession must be coupled with a lack of a satisfactoiy explanation or other 
incriminating circumstances as mentioned previously. If these conditions are met, then you may 
consider possession of recently stolen property, coupled with other inculpatory or incriminating 
circumstances as evidence of burglaiy. 
